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ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether Connecticut’s Megan’s Law, which disseminates truthful information
about convicted sex offenders without commenting on their current
dangerousness, violates the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution’s
Fourteenth Amendment.

2.

Whether Alaska’s Megan’s Law, w'hich seeks to protect the public by requiring
convicted sex offenders to register with the state so that the public may access
information about them, violates the U.S. Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause.
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Nos. 01-1231, 01-0729

IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 2002

CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, et al.,
Petitioners,
- against JOHN DOE, et al..
Respondents.

RONALD O. OTTE and BRUCE M. BOTHELO,
Petitioners,
-

against -

JOHN DOE 1. et al.
Respondents.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS,
SECOND CIRCUIT AND NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

I () n II: SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
Petitioners, CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, et al., petitioners
in cause 01-1231 before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and RONALD O.
O I I I: and BRUCE M. BOTHELO. petitioners in cause 01-0729 before the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, respectfully submit this brief.
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OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Second Circuit can be found at Doe v. Dent, of Pub. Safety, 271 F.3d
38 (2d Cir. 2001), and the opinion of the Ninth Circuit can be found at Doe 1 v. Otte, 259 F,3d
979 (9th Cir. 2001).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides. “No State shall. . .
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const, amend.
XIV. The Ex Post Facto Clause provides that “[n]o State shall... pass any ... ex post facto
Law . ...” U.S. Const, art. I, § 10.
The relevant statutory provisions are Connecticut General Statutes sections 54-250 et seq.
(2001) ("Connecticut’s Megan’s Law’'), and Alaska Statutes sections 12.63.010-12.63.100
(LEXIS L. Publg. 2001) (“Alaska’s Megan’s Law”).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews questions of law de

noxo.

l'3der v. Holloway. 510 U.S. 510. 516

(1994).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Preliminary Statement
This appeal concerns two cases regarding the constitutionality of sex offender registration
acts that originated in the states of Connecticut and Alaska. (Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 61, 195.)
This Court consolidated the cases upon granting certiorari. (J.A. at 230.)
I.

Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe.

On February 22,1999, Plaintiff John Doe (“Respondent") filed a complaint in the U.S.
District Coui1 for the District of Connecticut on behalf ol himsell and all others similarly situated
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under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, claiming that Connecticut’s Megan’s Law violates the Fourteenth
Amendment and Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution. (J.A. at 1, 63.) Respondent
named as defendants Dr. Henry C. Lee, Commissioner of Connecticut Department of Public
Safely; William Carbone, Director of Adult Probation and the Court Support Services Division
of the Judicial Department; and John Armstrong, Commissioner of the Connecticut Department
of Correction (collectively “the State”). (J.A. at 1.)
Respondent, a convicted sex offender, complains that registration requirements and
dissemination of publicly available information regarding him and other convicted sex offenders
unfairly stigmatizes them and deprives them of liberty and property interests, in violation of their
riuhts to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. (J.A. at 19.) Respondent further claims
that because his and other sex offenders’ convictions occurred prior to the enactment of
('onneelicut's Megan’s Law. they are not subject to its provisions pursuant to the Ex Post Facto
( lause of the U.S. Constitution. (J.A. at 20.) The State denies that Connecticut's Megan's Law
\ iolates cither the Due Process Clause or the Ex Post Facto Clause, but instead is a commonsense response arising from a nationwide concern about sex offenders and parents’ desire to
know who is living and working in their neighborhood. (J.A. at 81.)
On March 31,2001, the district court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment
on the ex post facto claim, finding that the legislature did not enact the law with punitive intent
and that its effects are not so punishing as to render it punitive in fact. (J.A. at 25.) The district
court also granted Respondent’s motion for summary judgment as to his due process claim. (J.A.
at 25.) On May 18, 2001, the district court issued a permanent injunction, barring public
disclosure and dissemination of the infonnation contained on a website - including convicted sex
offenders’ names, addresses, photographs and other identifying information. (J.A. at 55.) That

same day, the State appealed the ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
(J.A. at 73.) Respondent subsequently appealed the district court’s ruling on his ex post facto
claim. (J.A. at 75.) On October 19, 2001, the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling
as to both claims. (J.A. at 81.) On May 20, 2002, this Court granted certiorari. (J.A. at 108.)
2.

Otte V. Doe I.

On May 13, 1994, Jolin Doe I, John Doe II, and Jane Doe. wife of John Doe I,
(collectively “Respondents”) filed a complaint with the U.S. District Court for the District of
Alaska under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, claiming that Alaska’s Megan’s Law violates federal and
state constitutional rights. (J.A. at 109, 143-44.) Respondents named as defendants Ronald O.
Otte, Commissioner of the Alaska Department of Public Safety, and Bruce M. Bothelo. Alaska
Attorney General (collectively “the State”), both in their ofilcial and individual capacities. (J.A.
at

no.)
Respondents John Doe I and John Doe II, both convicted of .sexual felonies with minors,

alleged that Alaska’s Megan’s Law violates their civil rights afforded by the U.S. Constitution.
(J.A. at 143.) Respondents claimed Alaska’s Megan’s Law: (1) violates the Contracts ClauseArticle I, section 10; (2) denies due process and equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment; (3) is an ex post facto law prohibited by Article I. .section 10: (4) constitutes an
unreasonable search and seizure prohibited by the Fourth Amendment; and (5) invades their right
to privacy.' (J.A. at 143.)
On March 21, 1999, the district court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment
on the ex post facto claim, noting that Alaska’s Megan’s Law is not punitive in its intent or in its
effect. (J.A. at 168.) The district court also granted the State's motions for summary judgment

' Jane Doe's allegations are unrelated to the ex post facto issue raised on appeal. (J.A. at 143.)
4

on the claims pertaining to modification of a prior contract, federal right to privacy, federal due
process, and pendant state law claims. (J.A. at 185.)
The district court dismissed Respondents' claims with prejudice on August 13, 1999.
(J.A. at 192.) Respondents appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit that same day. (J.A. at 204.) On April 9, 2001, the court of appeals reversed and
remanded the district court's ruling, addressing only the ex post facto claim. (J.A. at 212.) On
I'ebruary 19, 2002, this Court granted certiorari. (J.A. at 229.)
Statement of Facts
1.

Megan’s Law.

In July 1994, a 7-ycar-old New Jersey girl named Megan Kanka was raped and murdered
by a twice-convicted sex offender who. unbeknownst to Megan’s family, lived in their
neighborhood. Megan’s death prompted a nationwide call for better tracking of sex offenders
and better dissemination of information so that parents can better protect their children.

See

Matthew Daly. Family Sees Sex Offender Bill Signed: Megan’s Law a Reality. Hartford Courant
A3 (May 31,1995). Although New Jersey enacted the original statute, today all 50 states have
adopted some version of Megan's Law to avoid losing out on vital federal crime-fighting funds
under the federal Jacob Wcttcrling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender
Regi.stration Program. See Kellie A. Wagner, High Court Takes Up Megan’s Law, Conn. L.
Trib. 1 (May 27, 2002). The nationwide implementation of Megan’s Laws by state and federal
legislatures underscores the importance of public policy goals that monitor sex ofTenders through
registration and notification statutes that inform law enforcement and the general public of
c(mviclcd sex offenders within their midst.
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2.

Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe.

In 1998 and 1999, the Connecticut General Assembly revised its version of Megan’s
in order to continue receiving federal crime-fighting funds. (J.A. at 26.) The federal law, 42
U.S.C. section 14071, requires that states maintain a registry of convicted sex offenders and
release the information to law enforcement and the public as necessary to ensure public safety.
(J.A. at 26, 27.) Connecticut’s Megan's Law requires registration for four specified categories:
criminal offenses against a victim who is a minor, sexually violent offenses, felonies committe(j
for a sexual purpose, and nonviolent sexual offenses. Sec Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-251,54-252,
54-254. Individuals convicted of sexually violent offenses must update their registry informatioj^
every ninety days; other registrants only have to update their information annually. (J.A. at 11.)
The law provides for a user-friendly website rcgistr>' that allows the public to search th^
convicted sex offender database by using a name, city or zip code. (J.A. at 30.) The \\ebsite
specifies that individuals are included in the registry because they have been convicted of a
qualifying offense. (J.A. at 31.) Information contained on the website makes it clear the State
has not determined whether registrants are currently dangerous, but is pro\'iding the registry as a
public ser\4ce. (J.A. at 31.) The website admonishes visitors against using the information to
harass the listed individuals. (J.A. at 31.) The first page of the website registry includes the
following message:
The registry is based on the legislature’s decision to facilitate access to
publicly-available [sic] information about persons convicted of sexual
offenses. The Department of Public Safety has not considered or assessed
the specific risk of reoffense [sic] with regard to any indi\ idual prior to his
or her inclusion within this registry, and has made no determination that
any individual included in the registry is currently dangerous. Individuals
included within the registry are included solely by virtue of their
conviction record and state law. The main purpose of providing this data
on the Internet is to make the information more easily available and
accessible, not to warn about any specific indi\ idual. Anyone who uses
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this information to injure, harass, or commit a criminal act against any
person included in the registry or any other person is subject to criminal
prosecution.^
(J.A. at 31.)
Although the record below provides no information about the crimes for which
Respondent was convicted, his complaint in the trial court admits that he was convicted of a
sexual offense that subjects him to the registration requirements of Connecticut’s Megan’s Law.
(J.A. at 3.)
3.

Otte V. Poe I.

In 1993, hearings held before the Alaska Legislature presented testimony that showed
Alaska had a prevalent and growing problem of sexual abuse within its borders. (J.A. at 139-40
nn. 4~9.) Information provided at the hearings established that Alaska had the highest child
sexual abuse rate in the nation (six times the national average), the second highest sexual assault
rale in the nation, and incidents of rape had jumped 91 percent over the previous two years. (J.A.
at 139.) Lvidcncc produced at the hearings indicated that the high number of sexual offenders in
Alaska would increase at twice the rate it had prior to 1993. (J.A. at 140.) Finally, studies
presented to the Alaska Legislature evidenced sex offenders’ high recidivism rate. (J.A. at 140.)
After receiving testimony and evidence, the Alaska Legislature found:
(1) sex offenders pose a high risk of re-offending after release from custody;
(2) protecting the public from sex offenders is a primary' governmental interest;
(3) the privacy interests of persons convicted of sex offenses are less important than the
government’s interest in public safety; and
(4) release of certain information about sex offenders to public agencies and the general
public will assist in protecting the public safety.
(J.A. at 140.)

This quote is taken from the district court opinion because the website is not publicly available
at this time due to the court's permanent injunction issued May 17. 2001.
7

Based on these findings, the Alaska Legislature enacted Alaska's version of Megan’s
Law in 1993 for the purpose of protecting the public safety. (J.A. at 138, 140, 160.)
Alaska’s Megan’s Law contains both registration and notification provisions for sex
offenders. (J.A. at 140.) To comply with the registration provisions the convicted sex offender
must register in person at either the Alaska State Trooper post or municipal police department
located nearest to where the sex offender resides at the time of registration. (J.A. at 141.) The
registration provisions solicit basic information necessary to monitor the whereabouts of released
sex offenders. (J.A. at 141.) If the sex offender has only one prior offense, the registration
requirement ends fifteen years from the date of unconditional release. (J.A. at 141.) How'ever, if
the sex offender has two or more convictions the registration requirement continues for life.
(J.A. at 141.)
The notification provisions of Alaska’s Megan’s Law provide

hiw

enforcement agencies

and the public access to the sex offender’s name, date of birth, address, photograph, place of
employment, and public information about the conviction, (J.A. at 141.) Additionally, the
notification provisions charge the Department of Public Safety w'ith responsibility for
maintaining a central registry of sex offenders. (J.A. at 141-42.) Consistent w'ith its duties to
make Alaska communities safer and provide access to information regarding persons convicted
of rape and child molestation, the Department of Public Safety made the Alaska Sex Offender
Registry available over the Internet beginning in June 1997. (J.A. at 142.) The opening display
of the Internet site contained the following warning: “This information is made available for the
purpose of protecting the public. Anyone who uses this information to commit a criminal act
against another person is subject to criminal prosecution.’* (J.A. at 142.)
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Both Doe I and Doe 11 were convicted for sexually abusing minors. (J.A. at 212-13.) In
] 985, Doe I entered a plea of riolo contendere to a charge of sexual abuse of a minor and the
Alaska Superior Court convicted Doe I for the routine sexual abuse of his daughter over a twoyear period — from age 9 to age 11. (J.A. at 212.) In 1984, Doe II also entered a plea of nolo
contendere

to a charge of sexual abuse of a minor, and the Alaska Superior Court convicted Doe

II for the sexual abuse of a minor - a 14-year-old child. (J.A. at 213.) As a result of their
convictions for felonious sexual behavior. Doe 1 and Doe II are subject to the registration and
notification requirements of Alaska’s Megan’s Law. (J.A. at 212.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I'he Connecticut and Alaska Megan’s Law statutes are constitutionally sound and should
be upheld by this Court as necessary and appropriate responses to the very real concern shared
b\' families across this nation about the dangers posed by sex offenders living in our midst. Both
laws require convicted sex offenders - including rapists and child molesters - to provide
information about their whereabouts so the state may disseminate it to law enforcement and
parents may make informed decisions about how to prevent the sort of tragedy that occurred in
New Jersey in 1994.
Scven-> car-old Megan Kanka’s rape and murder at the hands of a twice-convicted sex
offender living down the street prompted a nationwide clarion call for sex offender registration
and notification laws. In fact. Congress ordered states to adopt such laws, or else lose vital
federal crime-fighting funds. Convicted sex offenders subject to the various state Megan’s Law
statutes ha\'e challenged the laws on a variety of grounds. Their attacks have included lawsuits
based on constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment, double jeopardy.
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unreasonable search and seizure, ex post facto laws, and denial of equal protection and due
process.
Respondent’s due process challenge in Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe
fails because he cannot satisfy the long-recognized stigma plus test developed by this Court in
Paul V. Davis. 424 U.S. 693, 701-02 (1976). The State has not made a false, stigmatizing
statement about Respondent, nor damaged his already-tarnished reputation. Additionally,
Connecticut’s Megan’s Law does not implicate a constitutionally protected interest, as is
required under the plus prong of the stigma plus test. Because Respondent meets neither the
stigma nor the plus prong of the relevant test, his constitutional challenge based on the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment fails, and this Court should reverse the Second
Circuit's ruling.
Similarly, Respondents in Otte v. Doe 1 fail to establish that Alaska’s Megan’s Law
violates the U.S. Constitution’s prohibition on ex post facto laws because it fails the intenteffects test set forth in U.S. v. Ward. 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980). The law was neither intended to
be punitive, nor does it effectively punish registrants. Discussions in the Alaska Legislature
emphasized that the law had a non-punitive purpose, namely protection of the public through the
collection and dissemination of truthful information about convicted sex offenders. With the
law’s intent clearly non-punitive, Respondents must show by the ‘‘clearest proof’ that its effect is
to punish in order to make a valid claim. They fail to satisfy this high standard.
In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez. 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963), this Court identified
seven factors that must be weighed to determine whether a statute’s effect is punitive.
Respondents and the State disagree primarily on three factors: whether Alaska's Megan's Law
(1) imposes an affirmative disability or restraint on registrants, (2) promotes the traditional aims
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of punishment - deterrence and retribution, or (3) is excessive in relation to the non-punitive
purpose assigned. A careful balancing of the Mendoza-Martinez factors weighs in favor of
upholding Alaska’s Megan’s Law as an appropriate, non-punitive response to community
concern about convicted sex offenders, who - as a class - are more likely to commit sexual
offenses. This Court should reverse the Ninth Circuit’s ruling and find Alaska’s Megan’s Law
constitutional on its face and as applied.
ARGUMENT
Respondents make two unpersuasive arguments as to why this Court should invalidate
Alaska and Connecticut’s Megan’s Law statutes. They claim that Connecticut’s statute violates
convicted sex offenders’ rights to due process, and that Alaska’s law violates the Constitution’s
hi\n

on ex post facto laws. For the reasons slated below, the states of Connecticut and Alaska ask

Ibis Court to uphold both laws as necessary and appropriate responses to citizens’ concern about
con\'ictcd sex offenders. We ask this Court to reverse the Second Circuit and Ninth Circuit
decisions and permit state legislatures to provide accurate, truthful information to their citizens
so that they may make informed decisions about their safety and their children’s safety.
I.

CONNECTICUT’S MEGAN'S LAW DOES NOT VIOLATE CONVICTED SEX
OFFENDERS’ RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS BECAUSE IT DOES NOT SATISFY THE
STIGMA PLUS TEST.
The Second Circuit erred when it invalidated Connecticut’s Megan’s Law. Although the

I ].S. Constitution prohibits a state from depriving a person of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, the Fourteenth Amendment is limited. Paul. 424 U.S. at 700. It only ser\'es to
bar state action that is done “under color of law” and which deprives a person “of some right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” M, A plaintiff claiming a due process
violation under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 must show: (1) the state made a stigmatizing statement
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about him that is sufficiently derogatory to injure his reputation and (2) the state has imposed a
tangible and material burden that alters his status or implicates a protected right (‘‘stigma plus
tesf'). Paul. 424 U.S. at 701-02. Furthermore, the plaintiff must show that the state’s
stigmatizing statement caused the alteration in legal status or infringed the protected interest, fth
at711.
A.

Respondent’s Claim Fails the Stigma Prong of the Stigma Plus Test because the
State Has Not Made a False Statement that Injured His Reputatiom
1.

Inclusion on the website does not satisfy the stigma prong because the
statement is true.

If the Court finds that Connecticut’s Megan’s Law violates the Due Process Clause, the
mandated remedy is “an opportunity to refute the charge.” See Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624,
627 (1977). To satisfy the stigma prong of the stigma plus test. Respondent must show that the
reputation-tarnishing statement about him is “substantially false.

S_e_e i^ (noting that a name-

clearing hearing is only useful if there is a factual dispute over the statement that injured
plaintiffs reputation). Plaintiff is unable to show the government made a false statement,
therefore he is unable to satisfy the stigma prong. See id.
The respondent in Codd argued that the New York City Police Department denied him
due process when it fired him and placed a stigmatizing report in his personnel file without
affording him a hearing. Id. at 624-25. He alleged that the report about his apparent suicide
attempt resulted in his dismissal from a subsequent job. Id at 625. He did not, however, dispute
the accuracy of the report. Id. at 627. The Court found that a hearing would serve no useful
purpose because there was no factual dispute. Id. at 628. The Court gave little weight to the fact
that the subsequent employer, Penn-Central Railroad Police Department, interred that
Respondent was fired because of the suicide attempt. Id at 626. 628.
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Like the respondent in Codd> Respondent here does not assert that the information
contained in the website registry was false. He does not challenge the statement that he was
convicted of a qualifying sex offense. In fact, he admits as much in his complaint filed with the
district court. (J.A. at 3.) Therefore, this Court should acknowledge that there is no factual
dispute about the accuracy of the information contained in the Connecticut website registry, and
deny Respondent’s request for a hearing as it did in Codd. See 429 U.S. at 628.
In sum, Respondent fails to satisfy the stigma prong because the State has disseminated
only truthful information about him. Any notion that the State should prohibit the dissemination
of truthful information is contradicted by this Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.
St. Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (criticizing as
liighly paternalistic a state law that seeks to protect consumers by prohibiting truthful

advertising).
2.

Website visitors’ assumptions that Respondent is currently dangerous do
not constitute a stigmatizing statement by the State.

Instead of asserting an inaccuracy in the infonnation. Respondent’s anemic argument
rests on the possihilUy that some people who read the website registry may infer that Respondent
is currently dangerous. His argument fails for lack of support. This Court has never held that
statements, wliich others infer to be defamatory, constitute a stigma for purposes of the Due
ITocess Clause. In fact, this Court has indicated that the opposite is true: assumptions made by
people who receive the information in question are not enough to constitute a reputation
damaging statement. Bd. of Regents of St. Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573-75 (1972).
In Roth, a non-lenured teacher claimed he was denied due process when the state
university declined to rchire him after his one-year temi ended and failed to provide a hearing or
cNplain the non-retention decision. 408 U.S. at 567-68. This Court noted that it was not enough
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that the lower courts assumed that non-retention would stigmatize the teacher and affect his
future job prospects. Roth, 408 U.S. at 574 n. 13. The Court found that non-retention did not
impose ‘^a stigma or other disability that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other
employment opportunities.” Id at 573. “The state, in declining to rehire the [teacher], did not
make any charge against him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in his
community.” Id.
Respondent’s argument in the present case is similarly illogical. He claims that the
State’s act of offering a website with accurate information that is otherwise publicly available
constitutes a false statement simply because a website visitor may assume Respondent is
dangerous based on the information contained there. (J.A. at 17-19.) Respondent cites the
newspaper libel case of Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497 U.S. 1, 17-20 (1990), for the proposition
that defamatory comments need not be explicit to create a cause of action. In that case, a
newspaper columnist accused a high school wrestling coach and school superintendent of perjurv'
- a crime for which they were neither arrested nor convicted. Id at 4. The column described a
braw'l that broke out at a wrestling meet and the subsequent investigative hearing before the high
school athletic association. Id at 5. The column stated: “Anyone who attended the meet. . .
knows in his heart that Milkovich and Scott lied at the hearing after each having gi\ en his
solemn oath to tell the truth.” Id The Court held that a reasonable fact finder could conclude
that the newspaper had defamed the men by accusing them of perjury. Id. at 21.
Even if this Court were to expand its Due Process jurisprudence by adopting the
Milkovich rule that defamation need not be explicit, Connecticut's Megan’s Law is
distinguishable on tw'o key issues. First, the State did its utmost to dispel the notion that it had
made a determination as to registrants' propensity to re-offend. The website (when it was active)
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conlained an explicit message to viewers that the State had made no assessment about the
registrants' current dangerousness.^ Comparatively, the newspaper columnist in Milkovich did
his utmost to convince readers that the wrestling coach and school superintendent had lied under
oalh.*^ Second, the subjects of the statements are exact opposites. In the present case, the State is
informing the public through its website that registrants have been convicted of certain sex
offenses and crimes against children. (J.A. at 31.) In Milkovich. the newspaper accused two
men of committing crimes for which they were never even arrested. 497 U.S. at 4.
If the Court intends to expand the stigma analysis in due process cases to recognize as
stigmatizing statements that are factually accurate but are capable of being perceived as false and
ilefamatory. a more appropriate test is that articulated in White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909
1 .2d 512. 520 (D.C. Cir 1990). The test provides that a statement is not defamatory if, viewed in
its entire context, it merely con\'eys materially true facts from which a defamatory' inference can
reasonably be drawn. If the context or language of the statement supplies additional, affirmative
e\ idence suggesting that the speaker intends or endorses the defamatory inference, the statement
will be deemed to carry that meaning (''White test"). White. 909 F.2d at 520.
fhe White test is relevant for the present case and other Megan’s Law cases because it
takes into account the context in which the statement was made. In Connecticut's case, the State

' The first page of the Internet registry states: “The Department of Public Safety has not
considered or assessed the specific risk of reoffense [sic] with regard to any individual prior to
liis or her inclusion within this registry, and has made no determination that any individual
included in the registry is currently dangerous. Individuals included within the registry are
included solely by virtue of their conviction record and state law.” (J.A. at 31.)
‘ file headline of the column read; “Maple [Heights High School] beat the law with the ‘big
lie.'" and the headline on the carryover page read: “[Columnist] says Maple told a lie."
Milkox ich. 497 U.S. at 4. The column itself included the following statement: “If you're
successful enough, and powerful enough, and can sound sincere enough, you stand an excellent
chance of making the lie stand up, regardless of what really happened." Id at 5.
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makes clear it is not implying that registrants are currently dangerous. (J.A. at 31.) The
disclaimer eliminates the possibility that website visitors will infer that the State has determined
whether Respondent and the other registrants are likely to re-offend. Members of the public may
make up their own minds about the convicted sex offenders’ current dangerousness. Under the
White test, Connecticut’s Megan’s Law would not satisfy the stigma prong of the stigma plus
test because the website registry simply provides materially true facts from which a defamatory
inference may be drawn. See 909 F.2d at 520.
In conclusion, this Court has noted that implications are not enough in the context of a
due process claim; the proper standard is an explicit, false statement. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 573
('‘there is no suggestion that the state, in declining to re-employ the respondent, imposed on him
a stigma or other disability”). If the Court intends to expand its Due Process jurisprudence to
recognize defamation by implication, however, the White test provides the most appropriate
standard forjudging whether Megan’s Law registries constitute a stigma. See 909 F.2d at 520.
3.

Any damage to Respondent’s reputation results from his conviction for a
sex offense rather than inclusion on the website.

In addition to the website registry information being true. Respondent cannot show that
the “slatcmcnf’ about him was sufficiently derogatory to damage his reputation as is required
under the stigma plus test. Paul. 424 U.S. at 701-02. When the state defames a person with a
derogatory label sufficient to damage his “good name, reputation, honor, or integrity,” it can
constitute a stigma under the stigma plus test. Id at 708-09 (citing Wis. v. Constantineau, 400
U.S. 433,437 (1971)). The Court made clear, however, that a due process claim will not lie
against the state for publicizing an official act such as an arrest. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 713.
(noting that plaintiff could not claim constitutional protection against the disclosure of the fact of
his arrest on a shoplifting charge).
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As an example of reputation-damaging stigma, this Court found defamatory a Wisconsin
law that permitted police to post a notice in liquor stores forbidding the sale of alcohol to an
individual, which effectively labeled her a drunk. Constantineau. 400 U.S. at 436. The posting
could be based solely on the written request of a spouse or city leaders; the statute did not require
that the individual be convicted - or even arrested - for any alcohol-related crime, such as drunk
driving or public intoxication. Id at 434. The Court found that the woman who was named on a
posted notice should have been given an opportunity to defend herself because she “may have
been the victim of an official's caprice.'" id at 437.
Comparatively, Connecticut's Megan's Law only provides for the listing of individuals
who ha\'e been convicted of specified sexual offenses or crimes against children, such as
kidnapping. Conn. Gen. Stal. §§ 54-251, 54-252, 54-254. The concern expressed by the
Constantineau Court - that a named indi\'idual might be the victim of an official’s caprice - is
simpl) not present here. Furthennore, any stigma that Respondent may suffer as a result of
being listed (^n the w ebsite registr>' flow s from the fact that he w'as convicted of a qualifying
offense, a crime which he chose to commit and for w'hich he w'as afforded due process
protections.^ So. any notion that Respondent's reputation was tarnished simply because he was
included on the sex offender registry is ridiculous.
Respondent damaged his own reputation when he decided to commit the sex crime for
which he was convicted. The fact that law enforcement and members of the community are able
to \'isit a website and obtain information about Respondent’s past crimes bears little distinction
from the fact that anyone can comb through courthouse records and discover the information on

Respondent does not assert that he was denied due process when he was charged and convicted
of his qualif\ ing sexual offense.
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their own, or that newspapers are entitled to publish articles about Respondent’s arrest and
conviction. See Time. Inc, v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) (noting that “[e]xposure of the self
to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized community. The risk of this
exposure is an essential incident of life in a society, which places a primary value on freedom of
speech and of press).
In sum, the State has not stigmatized Respondent by including him on the website
because the statement was true (i.e., he is a sex offender). Cf Codd. 429 U.S. at 627 (holding
that plaintiff must show the reputation-tarnishing statement about him is false). Furthermore,
inclusion on the website was not the cause of any damage done to his reputation. See c.g. Doe
V.

Kcllcv. 961 F. Supp. 1105, 1110 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (noting that notification provisions

themselves do not touch the offender at all). Therefore. Respondent has not met the first prong
of the stigma plus test, and his claim of a due process violation fails. I his Court should reverse
the Second Circuit’s ruling.
B.

Respondent’s Claim Fails the Plus Front! because the Retzistration and
Notification Provisions of Connecticut's Meuan’s Taw Do Not Implicate a
Protected Interest.

Government action that impacts reputation alone, without a more tangible interest such as
employment, is not sufficient to invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause.
Paul. 424 U.S. at 701. Under the second prong of the stigma plus test. Respondent must show
that the State imposed a tangible and material burden that alters his status or implicates a
protected right. See id. at 701-02.
1.

Connecticut’s Megan’s Law docs not deprive Respondent of a liberty
interest because it does not alter his legal status.

Fven if the Court assumes that inclusion on the website did harm Respondent's
repulation. mere defamation by a public official does not deprive an individual of a protected
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interest within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. Paul. 424 U.S. at 702. To establish a
protected liberty interest, a plaintiff must show that the state action deprived him of aright
prc\ iously held under state law.

at 708. Liberty interests include: freedom from bodily

restraint, the right of an individual to contract, engage in “any of the common occupations of
life." acquire useful knowledge, marry, establish a home, raise children, worship God according
to the dictates of one’s own conscience, and generally “enjoy those privileges long recognized ..
. as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” Roth, 408 U.S. at 572.
Respondent seizes on broad language contained in Paul that guarantees procedural
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever the state seeks to remove or significantly
alter an individual’s protected legal status. 424 U.S. at 711-12. Respondent makes the
Linsubstanliated argument that the registration requirements contained in Connecticut's Megan’s
Law and the penalties for non-compliance significantly alter his legal status, thereby depriving
him of a protected liberty interest.
First, there is no Connecticut law that guarantees a resident the right to be free from
paperw ork on an annual basis. In fact, the opposite is true. All residents are required to file their
state taxes annually, drivers must pay their automobile registration fees every year, and motorists
are required to update their dri\'cr's license infomiation and car registration whene^'er they move.
See Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-17a, 14-45 (2001).
Second, the mere fact that Respondent must update his registry information annually or
e\ cry 90 days does not restrict his right to move about the state - or even leave the state if he
wishes. In fact, Connecticut’s Megan's Law specifically permits a registrant to travel or move to
another slate without seeking the State's approval. See Conn. Gen. Slat. §§ 54-251, 54-252, 54254. Cf Weems v. U.S.. 217 U.S. 349. 380-81 (1910) (invalidating a statute on the basis of
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cruel and unusual punishment because petitioner not only had to register with the authorities, but
could not relocate unless he obtained written permission).
Third, the fact that registration is triggered by conviction for a sex offense is not
sufficient to alter Respondent’s legal status. This Court has upheld a state law that revoked the
medical license of a doctor convicted of a felony even though it infringed on his right to practice
his chosen profession. Hawker v. N.Y.. 170U.S. 189, 196(1898). Federal appellate courts
across the country have upheld 18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(9), a federal statute that prohibits
individuals convicted of a misdemeanor domestic violence offense from owning firearms. E.g.
IJ.S. v. Denis. 297 F.3d 25, 32 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting that it is immaterial in terms of
constitutionality that the firearm prohibition statute is triggered by a prior conviction for
domestic violence); U.S. v. Mitchell. 209 F.3d 319, 322-23 (4lh Cir. 2000) (concluding that
appellant's “conduct in assaulting his wife - the act that led to his misdemeanor domestic
violence conviction - put [him] on sufficient notice" that he would be subject to a law
prohibiting firearm possession), cert, denied. 531 U.S. 849 (2000). Like the medical license at
issue in Hawker or the right to possess a firearm involved in the section 922(g)(9) cases, the fact
that the registration requirements under Connecticut's Megan's Law are triggered by a prior
conviction for a sexual offense should not render it unconstitutional.
There simply is no support for Respondent’s contention that the imposition of filling out
burdensome paperwork on a regular basis constitutes a change in his legal status. See e.g. Conn.
Gen. Stat. §§ 14-17a, 14-45. Additionally, Connecticut's Megan’s Law imposes no restriction
on Respondent’s right to travel and live where he pleases. See Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-251, 54252. 54-254. Finally, the fact that registration requirements are triggered by Respondent's prior
conviction for a sex offense poses no constitutional hurdle. See 1 lawker. 1 70 U.S. at 196.

Thercrore, Respondent fails to satisfy the plus prong of the stigma plus test with his claims of
deprivation of a liberty interest.
2.

Respondent is not deprived of a property interest because no slate law
guarantees him a right to his reputation.

Respondent's claim that he was a deprived of a property interest is similarly flawed.
Properly interests take many forms, but due process safeguards are intended to protect only
"interests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits.’* Roth. 408 U.S. at 576. To
ha\ e a properly interest in a benefit, a person must have “a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.”
IT at 577. Property interests are not created by the Constitution, but are rather a product of an
independent source, such as a state law. Id.
Research has disclosed no Connecticut law that guarantees Respondent and other
eoin ieted se.x offenders a specific property interest in their reputations. Cf Goldberg v. Kelly,
."97 U.S. 254. 257 n. 1 (1970). in which a state law guaranteed welfare benefits to eligible
applicants. Similarly, the courts have found property interests in jobs that were tenninated
despite tenure or contract pro\'isions. Sec Slochowcr v. Bd. of Educ.. 350 U.S. 551,559 (1956)
(holding that a public college professor dismissed from an office held under tenure provisions
has a continued interest in employment that is protected by due process): see also Wiemanv.,
I ’pdeuraff. 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952) (holding that college professors and staff members
dismissed during the terms of their contracts were denied due process). Respondent’s claimed
interest in his reputation is vastly different from the welfare benefits, tenured professorships and
contract employment that this Court previously considered. As the Roth Court noted.
Respondent "surely had an abstract concern" in his reputation, but he did not have a properly
interest as delhied under the Court's due process jurisprudence. See 408 U.S. at 578.
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Respondent’s reliance on Constantineau is misplaced. (J.A. at 89.) There, the Court
invalidated a state law that permitted police to post signs in retail liquor outlets that forbid the
sale of liquor to named individuals who, after excessive drinking, expose themselves or family
“to want*' or who become dangerous. Constantineau. 400 U.S. at 434. The Court held that the
Wisconsin “posting*’ law deprived the individual of a right previously held under state law: the
right to purchase alcohol. Id Comparatively, even without the website offered under
Connecticut’s Megan's Law, individuals arc free to comb public courtliouse records and obtain
the same information about Respondent. U.S. Dent, of J. v. Rptrs. Comm, for Freedom of the
Press. 489 U.S. 749, 753 (1989).
For the foregoing reasons. Respondent fails to substantiate his claim that Connecticut’s
Megan’s Law deprives him of a property interest. I herefore. he fails to satisfy the plus prong of
the stigma plus test, and his claim of a due process deprivation falls Hat. 'fhis Court should
reverse the Second Circuit’s decision, and uphold Connecticut's Megan's Law.
C.

Respondent’s Claim Fails the Stiuma l^lus 1'est because the Link between the
Stiema and the Plus Elements Is too Attenuated.

Even if this Court were to find that the stigma and plus elements are satisfied.
Respondent’s claim fails because the plus factor (i.e.. the allegedly status-altering registration
requirements) does not flow from the stigmatizing statement (i.e.. dissemination via the website).
Sec Paul. 424 U.S. at 7II (noting that plaintiff was required to show that “as a result of the state
action complained of, a right or status previously recognized by state law was altered or
extinguished”).
As an example of appropriately linked stigma and plus factors, the Wisconsin statute in
Constantineau deprived plaintiff of her right to purchase alcohol because the defamatory flyer
posted in liquor stores prohibited retailers from selling to her. 400 I fS. at 435. Additionally, the

0?

(.'curt found a sufficient link between the stigma and the plus factors when a school damaged
students' reputations by suspending them for wrongdoing without an opportunity to clear their
names, which deprived them of their right to a public school education. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565, 575-75 (1975). Here, however, the stigma and plus elements are reversed. Any damage
that may be done to Respondent's reputation occurs only because the State has registered him as
a sex offender and disseminated information about him to the public.
The attenuated nature of the registration and notification provisions is further highlighted
In the fact that the remedy Respondent seeks - an opportunity to prove he is not currently
dangerous - only addresses the stigma element of the stigma plus test. (J.A. at 19.) In fact, the
permanent injunction issued by the district court and affirmed by the Second Circuit only
prevents the State from disseminating the registry information to the public. (J.A. at 56.) The
iniunclion does not order the Connecticut Department of Public Safety to discontinue registering
convicted sex offenders, nor does it indicate that registrants may ignore their obligation to update
information annually or every ninety days as required under Connecticut General Statutes section
54-257{c).
failure to satisfy the stigma and plus prongs of the stigma plus test and failure to show a
causal link between the two prongs renders Respondent's due process claim invalid. This Court
should reverse the Second Circuit's ruling and uphold Connecticut's Megan's Law.
11.

ALASKA'S MEGAN'S LAW DOES NOT VIOLATE THE EX POST FACTO
CI.AUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION BECAUSE IT IS NOT PUNITIVE UNDER
THE INTENT-EFFECTS TEST.
1'he Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibits states from enacting laws

liiat alter the punishment and inflict a greater penalty than what the law originally assigned to the
crime when it was committed. U.S. Const, art. 1. § 10: Calder v. Bull. 3 U.S. 386. 591 (1798). A
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retroactive statute is subject to the constraints of the Ex Post Facto Clause when the statute
“increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable.” Cal. Dept, of Corrections v. Morales.
514 U.S. 499, 506 n. 3 (1995). Therefore, the key to whether a statute is an ex post facto law is
whether it is punitive. Russell v. Gregoire. 124 F.3d 1079, 1083 (9th Cir. 1997), cert, denied.,
523 U.S. 1007(1998).
Whether a statute is classified as punitive requires a two-part inquiry known as the
“intent-effects” test. Ward, 448 U.S. at 248. Under the “intent-effects” test, a law violates the
Ex Post Facto Clause if: “(1) The legislature intended the sanction to be punitive; and (2) the
sanction is ‘so punitive’ in effect as to prevent the court from legitimately viewing it as
regulatory or civil in nature, despite the legislature's intent.” Russell. 124 F.3d at 1086-87.
In the case at hand, Respondents allege that Alaska's Megan's Law is an ex post facto
law' because it increases the penalty by which a crime is puni.shable. (J.A. at 143-68.) Under the
“intent-effects” test, however, the Alaska Legislature's intent is non-punitive and the effects of
the statute are reasonable in relation to legislative purpose. Therefore. Alaska's Megan's Law
does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
A.

The Alaska Legislature Did Not Intend Alaska’s Meuan's Law' to Be Punitive
because It Was Enacted to Promote Public Safety.

The first part of the “intent-effects” test looks to the declared purpose of the legislature as
well as the structure and design of the statute. U.S. v. Urserv. 518 U.S. 267, 288 (1996).
Beginning in 1993, the Alaska Legislature conducted hearings regarding the grow ing crisis of
sexual offenders and sex crimes within the state. (J.A. at 139.) After considering statistical,
historical, and anecdotal evidence the Alaska Legislature found that “recidivism of sex offenders
is a problem and that the registration of sex offenders and the release of certain information
about them will protect the public." Patterson v. Alaska. 985 P.2d 1007. 1011 (Alaska App.
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1999) (finding the Alaska Legislature's purpose for enacting Alaska's Megan’s Law was to
protect the public); (J.A. at 140.)
The purpose of the Alaska Legislature in enacting Alaska’s Megan’s Law was to promote
the public welfare, which it deemed was a “valid regulatory goal.’* Patterson. 985 P.2d at 1011.
Additionally, the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska, and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals agreed that the Alaska Legislature intended Alaska’s Megan’s Law to be a “measure
designed to accomplish a non-punitive purpose.” OUe, 259 F.3d at 986; (J.A. at 154, 160.)
These legislati% e findings demonstrate a clear, non-punitive intent on behalf of the Alaska
Legislature. See e.g. Urserv. 518 U.S. at 288.
Consistent with this non-punitive purpose, the structure and design of Alaska's Megan's
Law points to the civil aims of the Alaska Legislature, just as other valid sex offender
registration and notification statutes have. Russell. 124 F.3d at 1082 (upholding Washington's
Megan's Law, which requires sex offenders to register so the state can compile and disseminate
information to the public). Similar to Washington's Megan's Law', Alaska's Megan’s Law
requires convicted sex offenders to provide basic personal information that is then disseminated
to the public through notification provisions. M.; Alaska Stat. §§ 12.63.010-12.63.100.
'Therefore, this same statutory structure and design found in other Megan’s Law statutes is not
incon.sistent with the Alaska Legislature’s non-punitive intent. Russell. 124 F.3d at 1082.
Furthermore, the placement of a statute in the criminal code instead of the civil code does
not indicate that the legislature had a punitive intent. Patterson. 985 P.2d at 1012; see generally
Russell. 124 F.3d at 1079. Indeed, various chapters of Alaska's Criminal Code address many
areas of the law including bail, victims' rights, and post trial matters. Patterson. 985 P.2d at
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1012. Alaska’s Megan’s Law is placed in the Alaska Criminal Code only because it is “a by
product of a sex offender’s conviction.” Patterson. 985 P.2d at 1012.
Therefore, regardless of the codification of Alaska's Megan's Law in the Alaska
Criminal Code, the Alaska Legislature’s non-punitive intent was sufficient to establish a civil
remedy in an effort to deal with the immediate problem of sex offender recidivism and
increasing sex crimes within the State of Alaska. See Femedecr v. llaun. 227 F.3d 1244, 1249
(10th Cir. 2000) (noting that the clear purpose of Utah’s sex offender registration and
notification system (“Utah’s Megan’s Law”) established a non-punitive intent under the intenteffects test); (J.A. at 140.)
B.

The Registration and Notification Provisions of Alaska’s Megan’s Law Do Not
Have a Punitive Lffect because 1'hcv Are Appropriate in l.iuht of the Leaislative
Purpose.

The second part of the “intent-effects” test requires the challenging party to demonstrate
by “the clearest proof’ that the statutory scheme is “so punitive" in effect that it negates the
stale’s non-punitive intent. Kan, v. Hendricks. 512 U.S. 346. 361 (1997). This Court has noted
that the seven factors mentioned in Mendoza-Martinez. 372 U.S. at 168-69. while neither
cxhausti\'e nor dispositive, have been helpful in “detemiining whether a purportedly civil
sanction has been transformed into a criminal or punitive one.” Sec Ward, 448 U.S. at 249
(holding that civil penalties for polluting navigable waterways were not punitive but regulator\')The seven Mendoza-Martinez factors are:
(1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
(2) whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment,
(3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter,
(4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment - retribution
and deterrence,
(5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime.
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(6) whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable
for it, and
(7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.
Mendoza-Martinez. 372 U.S. at 168-69.
In analyzing statutes under these seven factors, there is no aggregate number of factors
that together automatically tip the scales tow'ard the “so punitive standard. Hudson v. U.S., 522
I I.S. 93. 101 (1997). Rather, the factors arc to be applied as a balancing test. M. However, of
the seven factors, three are substantial in the present case: (1) whether the sanction involves an
affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of
punishment - retribution and deterrence; and (3) whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned. Mendoza-Martinez. 372 U.S. at 168-69; Otte. 259 F.ad at 987-9,>.
(J.A. at 216-21.); see Ward. 448 U.S. at 249-50 (analyzing a civil penalty for polluting
wiiterw'ays by considering only the fifth Mendoza-Martine_z factor).
1.

Alaska's Megan's Law imposes no affirmative disability or restraint
because it neither approaches the infamous punishment of imprisonment,
nor regulates convicted sex offenders' behavior.

An affinnative disability or restraint is detemiined by whether a sanction approaches the
"inlamous punishment of imprisonment.” Cutshall v. Sundquist. 193 F.3d 466, 474 (6th Cir.
1999). cert, denied. 529 U.S. 1053 (2000). In Cutshall. after comparing the minimal burdens
imposed by the Tennessee Sex Offender Registration and Monitoring Act (“Tennessee's
Megan's Law”) to burdens imposed by other statutes that did not impose affirmative disability or
restraint on their subjects, the Sixth Circuit held that the statute’s registration and notification
provisions imposed no restraint whatever upon the activities of a registrant. UL at 474-75.
l ennessee's Megan's Law' required the registrant to notify the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation
of domicile, place of employment, and other basic data. Id.
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Here, Alaska’s Megan’s Law requirements, similar to I ennessee's Megan's Law, are less
onerous than restrictions on employment, termination of vested social security benefits, and
deportation. Cutshall. 193 F.3d at 474-75: see also Hudson. 522 U.S. at 104 (disbarment from
banking industry for misapplication of bank funds); Flemmine v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612-21
(1960) (termination of vested social security benefits for persons deported for engaging in
communist activities); Galvan v. Press. 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (deportation for prior
membership in Communist Party). The only marked difference between I ennessee’s Megan’s
Law and Alaska’s Megan’s Law is that in Alaska, registrants must register in person. Cutshall.
193 F.3d at 469-71;^ Alaska Stat. § 12.63.020(a)-(b).
Although Alaska’s requirement that individuals register in person may be involuntary^ and
inconvenient, it does not approach the magnitude of imprisonment. In-person registration
requirements do not prohibit where the sex offender may li\c. nor do they mandate that he or she
must request approval. Cf. Weems. 217 U.S. at 380-81 (invalidating a statute on the grounds
that it was cruel and unusual punishment because Weems not only had to register with the
authorities, but could not relocate unless he obtained written permission). Indeed, registered sex
offenders in the state of Alaska are free to come and go, even leave the stale, it they so choose.
Alaska Stat. § 12.63.030. The registration provisions require only that the convicted sex
offender notify the proper authorities within two weeks of a move. Id^
Similar to imprisonment, the Ninth Circuit analogized Alaska's Megan’s Law to
probation or supervised release. Otte, 259 F.3d at 987; (J.A. at 216.) However, unlike probation
or super\’ised release, Alaska’s Megan’s Law imposes no restrictions on registrants’ bcha\ ior.
Patterson. 985 P.2d at 1012. Alaska's Megan's Law^ only defines a sex offender's duly to
register and imposes sanctions for failure to comply with the statute. Id
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Additionally, inquiry into the effects of Alaska's Megan's Law cannot consider the
possible illegal responses of citizens to notification. Russell. 124 F.3d at 1092 (noting that all
“possible community responses" to the law were not so onerous as to preclude the court from
llnding the act regulatory or remedial). In considering a statute’s potential punitive effects
"courts must presume that law enforcement will [enforce] the law and will protect offenders
from vigilantism." Id. In the present case, the same rationale applies to the anticipation or
contemplation of any responses by the citizens of Alaska against registered sex offenders. See

id.
Furthermore, it is important to note that retaliatory behavior is not a result of community
reaction to receiving already public information. Doe v. Pataki. 120 F.3d 1263. 1280 {2d Cir.
1997). cert, denied. 522 U.S. 1122 (1998). Rather, it is the initial sex offense and commission of
the crime that motivates such acts, not Alaska’s Megan s Law itself. See id. Additionally, the
website clearly stated that the information provided was not to be used for purposes of
harassment or criminal conduct and that crimes against registrants would be prosecuted. (J.A. at
142.) As a result, possible illegal responses by Alaska citizens cannot be considered in analyzing
the effects of Alaska's Megan’s Law. See Russell, 124 F.3d at 1092.
Therefore, Alaska's Megan's Law provisions are not similar to imprisonment, super\'ised
release, or parole because they do not supervise or restrict sex offenders’ behavior. See e.g.
Cutshall. 193 F.3d at 474; Patterson. 985 P.2d at 1012. Therefore, this factor weighs against
llnding Alaska’s Megan’s Law has a punitive effect.
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2,

The traditional aims of punishment - deterrence and retribution - are not
furthered because a deterrent effect is not dispositive and Alaska’s
Megan’s Law affixes no culpability for prior criminal conduct.

A sanction’s deterrent effect does not necessarily mean that it must be classified as
criminal. Femedeer. 227 F.3d at 1252 (citing Urserv, 518 U.S. at 292 (holding that the interest
of deterrence may be expressed in civil statutes as well as criminal statutes to effectuate societal
goals)). Having already concluded that Utah’s Megan’s Law had “civil purposes and effects of
deterrence, avoidance and investigation,” the court in Femedeer held that this factor “cut both
ways.” 227 F.3d at 1252. The fact that the statute attached additional negative consequences to
sex offenses did not alone render it criminal punishment. Id.
The standard used to analyze a statute's deterrent effect, established in Ursery, and
reinforced by Femedeer can be applied to the present case. jd. Wliile Alaska s Megan s Lawmay deter registered sex offenders from committing further crimes, the additional negative
consequences to sex offenders do not alone render Alaska's Megan's Law punitive. Id Most
sex offenders will undoubtedly prefer to not comply with the statute. How'ever, the perspective
of the criminals does not determine whether a statute is punitive. Seg Mont, v. Kurth Ranch, 511
U.S. 767,
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n. 14 (1994) (noting that “whether a sanction constitutes punishment is not

dctemiined from the defendant’s perspective as even remedial sanctions carry the ‘sting of
punishment’”). The fact that Alaska’s Megan’s Law has been established for the civil purposes
of protecting the public and facilitating the flow of important information to law enforcement
and citizens of Alaska overrides sex offenders’ preferences. See id.
A statute is retributive if it affixes culpability for prior criminal conduct. Hendricks, 521
U.S. at 362 (explaining that an involuntary commitment statute for sexually violent predators
was not retributive because it did not attach culpability for prior criminal conduct, but used that
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prior conduct solely for “evidentiary purposes” in applying the statute). Here, Alaska's Megan s
Law does not affix culpability. See Alaska Stat. §§ 12.63.010-12.63.100. Rather, the sex
offender’s conviction serves an evidentiary purpose as a triggering mechanism for application of
a statute that monitors the general whereabouts of convicted sex offenders. Hendricks. 521 U.S.
at 362. Therefore, with respect to the traditional aims of punishment, retribution is not present in
Alaska's Megan’s Law. See id.
Additionally, any retribution in Alaska’s Megan’s Law must be found on the face of the
statute or in its design. Mendoza-Martinez. 372 U.S. at 169. As noted above, the Alaska
Legislature enacted Alaska’s Megan’s Law for non-punitive purposes. ^ discussion supra at
24. Nowhere in Alaska’s Megan’s Law does the statute mention retribution or enact
requirements consistent with retribution as it is understood in the traditional sense - affixing
culpability for prior criminal conduct. Hendricks. 521 U.S. at 362.
Because the intent of the Alaska Legislature was non-punitive, any extension of the
traditional aims of punishment is furthered only where civil and criminal non-punitive intent
coincide. As a result, this factor is inconclusive in determining whether the effect of Alaska’s
Megan’s Law is punitive. ^ Femedeer. 227 F.3d at 1252 (determining that this factor “cut
both ways” gi\ cn the “mixed effects” of a statute that has civil purposes with deterrent effects).
3.

Alaska’s Megan’s Law is not excessive in relation to the non-punitive
purpose assigned - public safety.

The third Mendoza-Martinez factor weighs whether the statute appears excessive in
relation to the alternative purpose assigned - in this case, public safety. 372 U.S. at 169. In
analyzing this factor, excessiveness alone may not be raised to dispositive status. Femedeer.
227 F.3d at 1249. Additionally, this Court has specifically disapproved of overemphasis on
ONcessi\'encss. Hudson. 522 U.S. at 118.
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In reaching the decision that Alaska’s Megan’s Law was excessive, the Ninth Circuit
relied heavily on (1) the statute’s lack of a risk-assessment mechanism, and (2) the broad nature
of the Internet used to execute the notification provisions. Otte. 259 F.3d at 991-93; (J.A. at 21921.) Given that the absence of a risk-assessment mechanism is not fatal to a statute and that the
Internet is a passive medium that increases efficiency and usefulness of already public
information, Alaska’s Megan’s Law is not excessive in relation to the non-punitive purpose of
assisting communities to protect themselves from sex crimes.
First, it is not necessary that Alaska’s Megan’s Law incorporate a risk-assessment
mechanism into its registration and notification. Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1253. In Femedeer, the
Tenth Circuit upheld Utah’s Megan’s Law, which had no risk assessment mechanism. Id at
1248-53. While noting that other states had chosen to incorporate defined risk-assessment
mechanisms into their statutes, the court explained that a statute is not necessarily excessive for
purposes of this Mendoza-Martinez factor simply because the stale has not achieved a fit
between ends and means. Id at 1253.
In the present case, Alaska’s Megan’s Law, similar to Utah's Megan’s Law, has not
incorporated a risk-assessment mechanism into its registration or notilication provisions. (J.A. at
140-42.) However, by disclosing the crime for which a registrant was convicted through the
notification provisions, Alaska’s Megan’s Law allows members of the public to assess the risk of
the offenders themselves. By allowing law enforcement and citizens to gauge the risk a
convicted sex offender poses to the community, both are empowered to protect themselves and
their families according to the risk they perceive. Just because the Alaska Legislature has not
achieved a perfect fit between the ends and means of Alaska's Megan's Law, does not
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necessarily mean that it is excessive in relation to the legislative purpose of registering convicted
sex offenders to assist law enforcement and protect the public. See Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1253.
Second, the execution of notification provisions through the Internet is not excessive in
relation to the purposes of sex offender registration statutes. Id. Although the Internet connects
users to information worldwide, there is a dramatic drop in the likelihood of sex offender registry
information being obtained or sought by individuals outside the state. Id. Furthermore, unlike
television and radio, the Internet is a passive medium and users must make an affirmative effort
to retrieve registration information. R at 1251. The Internet merely makes this valuable
information more accessible to the public. Id
FTior to the injunction, Alaska’s Megan’s Law used the Internet to facilitate the
notiiication of law enforcement and the public regarding the whereabouts of convicted sex
of fenders. (J.A. at 142.) Additionally, people outside the State of Alaska have little interest or
incentive to access tlie sex offender registry information. Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1253. But more
importantly, the Internet increases the efficiency of dissemination of public information to law
enforcement and the public by compiling the registration information into one central database.
Id: see also Patterson, 985 P.2d at 1013 (holding Alaska’s Megan’s Law is not an ex post facto
statute).
Unlike television and radio, which broadcast information to passive audiences, Alaska’s
Megan's Law utilizes the Internet, an effective central receptacle for this public information,
w Inch can be accessed only through an active effort to query the information. Femedeer, 227
I '.3d at 1253; (J.A. at 142.) As a result, use of the Internet to provide the general location of
com icted sex offenders, similar to that used in Utah's Megan's Law, would provide considerable
assistance to law enforcement and the public in the prevention, avoidance, and investigation of

these serious crimes. Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1253. Therefore, use of the Internet to execute the
notification provisions of Alaska’s Megan’s Law is not excessive in light of usefulness derived
from the implementation of more efficient communication of public information. Id^
In conclusion, because the absence of a risk-assessment mechanism is not fatal to a
statute, and the Internet increases the efficiency of disseminating the information, Alaska’s
Megan’s Law is not excessive in relation to the non-punitive purpose of assisting law
enforcement and informing to promote public safety. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169.
Therefore, this factor weighs against finding Alaska’s Megan’s Law has a punitive effect.
4.

Although not central to the analysis of punitive effects here, the
undisputed Mendoza-Martinez factors weight toward a civil effect.

The four factors which are not in dispute here arc: (1) whether the sanction has
historically been regarded as a punishment; (2) whether it comes into play only on a finding of
scienter; (3) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; and (4) whether an
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable to it. Mendoza^
Martinez. 372 U.S. at 168-69. All four will be summarily addressed in turn.
First, typically and historically, registration statutes are considered rcguIator>' measures.
Russell. 124 F.3d at 1089. While the historical analysis of notification statutes have a colorful
past, shaming punishments such as whipping, pillory, and branding generally involved (1)
physical involvement of the individual; and (2) direct confrontation with the public. Id at 1091.
In the case at hand, however, the physical participation required by the notice provisions
of Alaska’s Megan's Law is so nominal that it can hardly be compared to classic shaming
punishments such as pillory. Id. Furthennore, the clement of direct confrontation between the
offender and members of the public is non-existent. Id The dissemination of public infonnation
is not cNecuted for tlie purpose of shaming or punishing the convicted sex offender, as were
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historical shaming crimes, but is carried out to assist law enforcement and protect the public
from a group of convicted felons that the State of Alaska has determined to merit such exposure.
Russell. 124 F.3d at 1091. On these grounds, the registration and notification provisions of
Alaska’s Megan’s Law cannot be historically regarded as punishment. See e.g. Pataki, 120 F.3d
at 1283-84 (distinguishing banishment and pillory from New York’s Sex Offender Registration
.Act because burden of notification is imposed only after designated punishment has been ser\'ed.
not as punishment itself; and no physical restraint, mark, or pain is inflicted by the statute).
Therefore, this factor weighs against finding that Alaska’s Megan’s Law has a punitive effect.
Second, a finding of scienter requires that the act triggering the sanctions be done with
willful intent. Black’s Law Dictionary 1347 (Bryan A. Gamer ed., 7th ed.. West 1999). Because
Alaska's Megan's Law may also be triggered by crimes involving strict liability, such as
slatutory rape, the statutory sanctions do not become applicable only upon a finding of scienter.
(.l.A. at 217.); see Alaska Stat. § 12.63.100(l)-(6). Therefore, this factor weighs against finding
Alaska's Megan's Law has a punitive effect.
Third, if a factor applies only to behavior that is already criminal conduct, it is one more
factor in the analysis supporting the conclusion that its effect is punitive. Mendoza-Martinez,
372 t I.S. at 168. I lere. Alaska's Megan's Law applies only to “those persons who have been
convicted of a criminal offense.” (J.A. at 167.) However, this factor alone is insufficient to meet
the high burden of proof required to show that the effects of Alaska’s Megan’s Law are so
punitive as to nullify the Alaska Legislature's non-punitive intent. Flemming, 363 U.S. at 61221; see e.g. Femedeer. 227 F.3d at 1253 (concluding that the fifth Mendoza-Martinez factor was
the only factor that could reasonably weigh toward finding a punitive effect, however it alone
was insufficient to label Utah's Megan's Law unconstitutional).
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Finally, Respondents concede there is a non-punitive purpose of public safety that can be
rationally connected to Alaska’s Megan’s Law. (J.A. at 167.)
5

The Mendnza-Martinez factors do not meet the burden of proof necessary
to impeach the Alaska Legislature’s civil statutory scheme.

To discharge the Alaska Legislature’s civil intent, a plaintiff must show that the statutory
scheme is “so punitive” in effect that it nullifies the legislature's non-punitive intent.

WM.
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U.S. at 248-49. While the Mendoza-Martinez factors facilitate investigation into whether a
statute has a punitive effect, in order to show that the scheme is “so punitive, only the clearest
proof’ will suffice to invalidate a statute on such grounds. Flemming, 363 U.S. at 617. In
circumstances where this high burden of proof is met, the statutory scheme will be considered
criminal for constitutional purposes. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361.
In the present case, the Mendoza-Martinez factors fail to meet the high burden of proof
required to invalidate the Alaska Legislature’s civil intent. Flemming, 363 U.S. at 617. First,
because Alaska's Megan's Law neither approaches the infamous punishment of imprisonment,
nor regulates convicted sex offenders’ behavior, it imposes no affirmative disability or restraint.
Cutshall. 193 F.3d at 474. Second, because a deterrent effect is not dispositive and Alaska’s
Mcaan's Law affixes no culpability for prior criminal conduct, the traditional aims of
punishment are not furthered and therefore do not tip this factor toward a finding of a punitive
effect. Hendricks. 521 U.S. at 36: Urserv. 518 U.S. at 292. Finally, because the Alaska
Legislature’s purpose for enacting Alaska’s Megan’s Law is reasonably related to the
notification and registration provisions imposed, it is not excessive. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. at 169. These three Mendoza-Martinez factors fail to meet the burden of “clearest proof’
that is necessary to impeach a statute that is found to be non-punitive. Flemming. 363 U.S. at
617. Therefore, the burdens imposed by Alaska's Megan's Law are not punitive, but civil.
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Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49; see e.g. Femedecr. 227 U.S. at 1253 (holding that the burdens
imposed by Utaivs Megan's Law were civil only).
Given that the burden imposed by Alaska’s statutory scheme is not punitive under the
"intent-effects” test, Alaska’s Megan's Law is not an ex post facto statute and can be applied
retroactively to convicted sex offenders. Calder, 3 U.S. at 391; Russell, 124 F.3d at 1083. This
Court should reverse the Ninth Circuit’s erroneous decision and uphold Alaska’s Megan’s Law.
III.

I HE STRONG PUBLIC POLICY OF KEEPING CITIZENS INFORMED FAVORS
UPHOLDING CONNECTICUT AND ALASKA’S MEGAN’S LAW STATUTES.
A.

Sex Offenders Pose a Recognized Threat to Society,.

I'his Court acknowledged just earlier this year that sex offenders pose a serious threat to
society. McKune v. File. 122 S. Ct. 2017. 2024 (2002). When convicted sex offenders reenter
society, they are much more likely than any other type of offender to be rearrested for a new rape
or sexual assault. Id. (citing Sex Offenses and Offenders 1,27 (U.S. Dept, of J., Bureau of J.
Statistics 1997). The rale of recidivism of untreated sex offenders has been estimated to be as
high as 80 percent. McKiinc. 122 S. Ct. at 2024. In 1995 alone, an estimated 355,000 rapes and
sexual a.ssaults occurred nationwide. Id.
According to the U.S. Department of Justice, convicted rape and sexual assault offenders
.ser\ ing time in state prisons report that two-thirds of their victims were under the age of 18, and
58 percent of those - or nearly four in ten imprisoned violent sex offenders - said their victims
were aged 12 or younger. Sex Offenses and Offenders at iii. In 90 percent of the rapes of
children less than 12 years old, the child knew the offender. Id, Sex offenders are substantially
more likelv than other violent offenders to be rearrested for a new violent sex offense. Id, at 26.
¥

1 or example, approximately 8 percent of 2.214 rapists released from prisons in eleven states in
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1983 were rearrested for a new rape within three years, compared to approximately 1 percent of
released prisoners who serv'ed time for robbery or assault. Sex Offenses and Offenders at 26-27,
These stark statistics help explain the concern over sex offenders living in our midst.
But, e\'en more startling than the numbers are the gruesome stories about real people whose li\-es
have been tragically touched by a convicted sex offender.
B.

Megan's Law Is a Reasonable Response to the Threat Posed by Sex Offenders.

Most notable of the tragic stories that have touched Americans’ lives and raised
nationwide concerns about sex offenders was the rape and murder of 7-year-oId Megan Kanka,
the little girl whose name is synonymous with sex offender registry statutes in every state. ^
Wagner, Conn. L. Trib. at 1. The sadness over Megan’s death and the deaths of other children at
the hands of convicted sex offenders prompted a common sense approach to empowering
citizens to make their own decisions about ensuring their safety.
One former U.S. associate deputy attorney general argues that Megan's Law statutes have
a “laudatory objective": community self-defense. Bruce Loin. Megan's Law: When a Sex
Offender Moves in. Is there a Duty to Warn the Community?. 81 A.B.A.J. 38 (1995). Fein
notes, as did the Paul Court, that “govemment may publicize records of official acts, including
convictions, so long as the person's freedom of action remains unrestricted.” Id I le underscores
the fact that broad dissemination of registry information under Megan's Law statutes is
appropriate given the “wider opportunities for sex offenders to repeat their crimes. Id. Finally.
Fein offers critics some common sense advice from Justice Jackson's opinion in Terminiello v.
Chi.. 337 U.S. 1 (1949): doctrinaire logic must be tempered with a little practical wisdom to
avoid converting “the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.” Fein. 81 A.B.A.J. at 38.
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We ask this Court to heed Fein and Justice Jackson’s advice, and avoid invalidating two
state laws that could help aN’ert another tragedy similar to Megan Kanka’s fate. Connecticut’s
Megan’s Law docs not violate Respondent's right to due process and Alaska’s Megan’s Law
does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Therefore, this case comes down to whether state
legislatures have a right to empower their citizens by disseminating information that will allow
them to make informed decisions about how’ to protect themselves and their children. The states
of Connecticut and Alaska urge this Court to uphold Connecticut and Alaska’s Megan’s Laws.
CONCLUSION
Connecticut’s Megan’s Law does not deprive Respondent of his right to due process
because it docs not constitute a stigma nor infringe on a protected liberty or property interest.
Additionally. Alaska's Megan's Law does not violate the U.S. Constitution's Ex Post Facto
Clause because it is neither punitive in its intent nor in its effect. For the foregoing reasons,
Petitioners respectfully request this court REVERSE the judgments of the U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit on the due process claim, and the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit on the ex post facto claim.
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